NewsAndAnalysis.org

The MANPAD Threat - A Comparative Assessment

15 July 2006

 

A NewsAndAnalysis.org Ops-Analysis Assessment

 

Introduction

 

The 2002 al Qaeda attack on an Israeli civilian airliner departing Mombasa, Kenya, although unsuccessful, ignited concerns about similar attempts to use Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) against American civilians.  The aftermath of the September 11, 2001 (9-11) attacks on the United States have increased awareness about America’s vulnerabilities to terrorism.  Yet, despite significant improvements in airline security since 9-11, the industry remains largely defenseless against MANPADS.  Concomitant with U.S. efforts to improve its security is an attempt to understand how previous American policies may have contributed to this current threat.  Namely, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), with the support of Congress, delivered 1000 highly sophisticated Stinger missiles to Afghan Mujahideen in the late 1980s to support their resistance against the Soviet Union.  Although the CIA was selective in its dispersal of these systems, enemies of the United States now possess many of them.[1]  For example, in the weeks before 9-11, several Taliban soldiers carried Stingers during a parade in Kabul.  The financial resources and black market links of Osama bin Laden along with his close connections to many of the Afghan fighters make his possession of Stingers almost certain.  Although al Qaeda’s attack on the Israeli airliner used a more primitive MANPADS, their likely possession of more sophisticated weapons and their apparent willingness to conduct these types of strikes warrants the concern of U.S. security personnel.  This report will present a comparative assessment of MANPADS potentially available to terrorists intent on attacking U.S. targets and recommend a course of action based on those posing the greatest overall threat.

 

Data Sources and Methods

 

This report will present a comparative analysis of data covering the threat presented by various MANPADS and the security provided by several competing and complementary protective measures.  The threat will be assessed based on a characterization of each MANPADS in terms of the following variables:

• Affordability: the likely gray or black market cost of a particular weapon system.

• Availability: the ease with which a particular weapon system can be acquired as derived by the estimated quantity of weapons in circulation.

• Operational Effectiveness: the apparent attractiveness of a weapon system based on its ability to credibly execute its mission, including weapon range and altitude restrictions, speed, sensitivity to countermeasures, and ease of use.

• Maintainability: the extent to which a given weapon system will remain operational given the time since its last “official” maintenance, including battery, propellant, and coolant life.

Because complete and precise information is not available for all weapon systems, these variables are assessed on a high / medium / low scale, depicting the degree to which a particular variable supports terrorist interests.  These scores will be aggregated to determine whether a particular MANPADS poses a high, medium, or low threat.  Namely,

• High: a condition most favorable to terrorist interests.  For example, a “high” affordability score will be assigned to highly affordable weapons (small cost).  Similarly, a “high” operational effectiveness will be assigned to weapon systems most likely to execute successful attacks.

• Medium: a condition somewhat favorable to terrorist interests.  For example, a “medium” availability score will be assigned for weapon systems available in the thousands.  Stingers are available in the hundreds and SA-7s are available in the tens of thousands.  MANPADS available between these bounds are scored “medium.”

• Low: a condition largely unfavorable to terrorist interests.  For example, a “low” operational effectiveness will be assigned for a weapon system that is difficult to operate and susceptible to most countermeasures.

An overall assessment will be made about the threat each system poses by averaging its attainability (affordability and availability) and capability (operational effectiveness and maintainability) scores.

 

This report relies heavily on several exclusive – yet reliable – resources: Jane’s Intelligence Review, and the Federation of American Scientists.  Other, primarily Internet-based, resources are also considered.  This report acknowledges the lack of concrete information available on certain topics germane to this assessment.  Therefore, ranges of values are considered where appropriate.

 

MANPADS Threat

 

The unsuccessful November 28, 2002 terrorist attack on an Israeli civilian airliner in Mombasa, Kenya has raised concerns over the threat Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) pose.  In this particular instance, a group of three terrorists in a truck deployed two missiles from Russian made Strela 2M launchers at a distance of 2km from the airport.[2]  Investigators suspect that a second truck was standing by 5km from an alternative runway, waiting to attack if changes in wind patterns caused the flight to shift its takeoff.[3]  These missile systems had a similar serial number to a launcher found 3km from Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia on May 5, 2002 and believed responsible for a successful attack on an F-15 from that base.[4]  Another report claims Israeli intelligence linked them to a 2002 attempt to down Shimon Peres’s plane in Prague.  They can also be traced by serial number to a large cache of SA-7s acquired by terrorists in the former Soviet Union in 1979.  The incident in Mombasa was the first al Qaeda linked attack on a civilian airliner and one of the few MANPADS attacks outside a combat or insurgency region.[5]  However, other MANPADS terrorist attacks have occurred.  For example, SA-7s were used successfully against two Rhodesian airliners in 1970 and against a Sudanese airliner in 1986.  Indeed, some estimates claim as many as 42 civilian planes have been attacked in the last 25 years with MANPADS resulting in a 70-percent success rate.[6]  However, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) concludes that 25 downed aircraft and more than 500 casualties in 35 attacks is a more credible judgment.[7]  CRS also notes that the actual number is difficult to ascertain as some MANPADS attacks likely remain unreported and other non-MANPADS attacks have likely been misinterpreted.

 

MANPADS pose a particular concern for airline security officials.  Civilian airlines have been widely targeted for decades by terrorists because they have many vulnerabilities, offer potential for mass casualties, and are clear “symbols” of the nations from which they originate.[8]  Improvements in airline security since the first wave of hijackings in 1959 and especially since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States have made terrorist attacks on civilian aircraft more difficult.  MANPADS provide a means for terrorists to execute deadly attacks while remaining outside the normal airport security perimeter.  Additionally, the relatively low level of training needed to employ these systems makes them attractive to a broad terrorist audience.  Less planning is typically needed to execute a MANPADS attack than a hijacking and with less risk to the attacker.  The Mombasa attacks illustrate the relative ease with which terrorists can execute their attacks and then escape, leaving little evidence to trace them.

 

MANPADS Tradespace

 

A wide spectrum of MANPADS are currently available to terrorists.  On the open market MANPADS range from less than $1,000 for basic systems to more than $100,000 for the most advanced systems.[9]  The Russian made Strela that was used in Mombasa is considered the least expensive, least sophisticated, and most widely available option for terrorists.  More advanced systems like the Russian Igla and U.S Stinger are more expensive and rare, but have a significantly greater probability of a successful attack.  Table 1 summarizes MANPADS typically employed by terrorists potentially hostile to the United States.

 

Table 1: Summary of common MANPADS[10]

 

Table 1 illustrates an intuitive point: as the systems increase in sophistication they become more operationally capable and less susceptible to countermeasures.  The newest Russian Igla MANPADS are comparable to America’s most advanced Stinger systems.  All of these systems are easy to employ regardless of their technical sophistication.

 

Proliferation

 

MANPADS have been in production since the U.S. first introduced the Redeye in the late 1950s.[11]  As many as 350,000-500,000 MANPADS exist in current international military arsenals, but varying accounting and reporting standards among states make these numbers difficult to confirm.[12]  Jane’s Intelligence Review reports that as many as 150,000 MANPADS are in circulation around the world.[13]  Many of these weapons are available on the gray and black arms market.  Additionally, the rampant spread of MANPADS technology has allowed many nations to make leap-ahead improvements in their own designs.  For example, some reports claim that Pakistan sold some of its stockpiled Stinger missiles to China, which through reverse engineering developed its own version.  Finally, Jane’s reports that more than 27 terrorist organizations around the world are likely to have MANPADS.[14]  Appendix 1 provides a comprehensive list of non-state group suspected or known to possess MANPADS.  Several of these organizations, such as al Qaeda, Columbian FARC, and Lebanese Hizbullah, are considered to be threats to American interests.

 

Two U.S. transfers of Stinger missiles to terrorist-linked organizations receive regular attention.  First, the United States supplied 1000 Stingers to the Afghan Mujahideen during their conflict with the Soviet Union.[15]  Second, also in the late 1980s the CIA provided an unknown number of Stingers to UNITA rebels in Angola to support their overthrow of the local communist government.[16]  Some Stingers may also have been acquired by terrorists through nations to whom Stingers were legitimately sold.  After the end of the Afghan-Soviet war, the CIA earmarked $65 million to buy unused Stingers from the Mujahideen.  Although the success of the program is not publicly known, some analysts estimate as many as 300-600 systems remain unrecovered.[17]  Indeed, some analysts believe the most immediate effect of the buyback was to raise the black market value of the weapons.[18]  These systems are now 15 years old and some analysts suspect many have atrophied beyond use.   However, Jane’s notes that although the nominal battery life for Stingers is 10 years, rigging a replacement voltage source is not very difficult.[19]  Also, the fact that the recent SA-7 attack on an Israeli aircraft used a 28 year old missile indicates that propellants and coolants considerably outlast their nominal lifespan.[20]  Combined, these factors indicate that the likely number of operational Stingers remain in the “hundreds” range.

 

Russian-made MANPADS, however, are available in much higher quantity.  Jane’s reports, “Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the proliferation of SA-series MANPADS has increased, and the diffusion of these weapons now exceeds the infamous spread of U.S. made Stinger missiles from Afghanistan during the 1990s.”[21]  The frequent use of SA-series weapons by terrorists combined with the 1979 transfer of a large cache of these weapons to terrorists from the former Soviet Union indicates a sizable number of these weapons are available on the gray and black markets.  Further, their proven operational use many years beyond their nominal lifespan, as mentioned earlier, indicates that degradation is not a sizable factor.  SA-7a MANPADS were only manufactured for a brief period before their upgrade became available.[22]  Therefore, few of these systems are likely in circulation.  Additionally, the newest SA-18 MANPADS began production in 2003 and are unlikely to have entered the black market in any sizable quantity.  However, the recent arrest of a British arms dealer attempting to sell a new SA-18 indicates an interest within the arms community to supply these weapons.[23]  SA-7b, SA-14, and SA-16, however, have been in production for many years and were more widely available during the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Their available numbers are expected to be much higher than other SA-series weapons or the Stinger.[24]  Some analysts estimate tens of thousands of SA-7b and SA-14 systems are available on the gray and black market.  SA-16 are slightly more difficult to obtain.

 

Threat Mitigation

 

The Federation of American Scientists breaks threat mitigation into three categories that will also be used by this report:[25]

• Susceptibility reduction: measures taken to prevent a MANPADS missile from striking its intended target;

• Vulnerability reduction: measures taken to prevent loss of an aircraft following the missile’s impact with its intended target; and

• Non-proliferation: measures taken to prevent potential adversaries from acquiring MANPADS.

These categories include a spectrum of options to lessen the threat MANPADS pose to civilian aircraft.  They need not be implemented exclusive of one another.  Rather, increased effectiveness is expected as more options are incrementally executed.

 

Susceptibility reduction entails both tactical and technical options.  With little or no additional cost, air traffic control systems can implement tactics to ensure aircraft remain less predictable and more challenging to target.  For example, rapid climbing and descent or spiral maneuvers can be employed with some need for additional training and slightly lower safety margins in the case of engine failure.[26]  Airport security forces can also increase their surveillance and protection of potential MANPADS launch areas outside the airport’s immediate perimeter.  These measures, however, may require considerable funding depending on the complexity of the surrounding terrain and the current security measures already in place.  Finally, aircraft can be outfitted with technical countermeasures, to include flares, decoys, jammers, and lasers.  These systems are employed to some extent by current military aircraft, but are potentially very costly, especially in aggregate due to the 5,575 passenger aircraft expected to be in use in the U.S. in 2004.[27]  For example, at the high end, a laser system currently under development by the U.S. Air Force is estimated to cost $25 billion if it were implemented nationally on U.S. commercial aircraft.[28]  Current, less expensive measures, such as pyrotechnic flares cost $250,000 to $5 million per aircraft to install depending on the sophistication of the detection and deployment systems.[29]  Technical countermeasures will likely remain very expensive for all options unless significant breakthroughs are made to lower production and installation costs.

 

Vulnerability reduction entails aircraft modifications or redesigns to increase aircraft survivability if attacked.  System redundancy, hardening, and isolation along with improved fire suppression measures can improve an aircraft’s chance of surviving a MANPADS attack.[30]  Costs for these alterations vary and have not been fully estimated.  However, the total cost for these remedies will likely be high due to the large number of aircraft needing protection and the costs incurred by removing aircraft from service for potentially lengthy modifications.

 

Non-proliferation includes diplomatic, law enforcement, and military means intended to prevent potential adversaries from obtaining MANPADS.  America’s current military efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan to raid suspected weapons caches is an example of military nonproliferation efforts.  The recent arrest of a British arms dealer mentioned above is a law enforcement example of nonproliferation efforts.  Diplomatic efforts include pressure on potential proliferators to increase security and tighten export controls.  For example, Elements for Export Controls of MANPADS have recently been added to the Wassenaar Arrangement.  The G8 supported these controls in June 2003 and agreed to additional protections, like instituting weapon design changes that prevent unauthorized MANPADS use.[31]  Other international bodies are also improving their MANPADS controls.  Finally, the U.S. buyback programs seen in Iraq and Afghanistan are also nonproliferation measures seeking to limit the quantity of MANPADS available to potential adversaries.

 

Comparative Assessment

 

The data presented throughout this report provide a means to grade the attainability and capability of selected MANPADS.  These systems are graded subjectively, based on the judgment of the assessor, but within an objective framework comprised of the standardized metrics mentioned above.  To determine the overall threat, the score for each component (affordability, availability, operational effectiveness, and maintainability) is averaged to yield a final score.  All components are considered equal in value, i.e., the operational effectiveness score of a system was not weighted more than its affordability score.  Table 2 summarizes the assessment.

 

Table 2: Comparative assessment of overall threat posed by selected MANPADS

 

Maintainability is not a discriminator among MANPADS.  As mentioned earlier, all of these systems are simple enough to use that a terrorist would not likely choose one system over another based on this factor.  The attainability of the systems appears to be the largest discriminator.  Fortunately for security officials, the most operationally effective systems are the least affordable and least available.  The observed propensity of terrorists to use less sophisticated Russian MANPADS supports the overall threat findings presented in Table 2.  Their availability and affordability make them the weapon of necessity, rather than the weapon of choice.  The more operationally effective SA-16 system remains less available, but clearly presents a viable option for terrorists.

 

Recommendations

 

The data and comparative assessment presented in this report provide several supportable conclusions about steps to be taken to improve U.S. airliner security.  As mentioned earlier, no single option should be pursued to the exclusion of other options.  However, some options offer distinct benefits.

 

Two options will result in potentially costly aircraft modifications and technical upgrades: installation of countermeasure systems and vulnerability reduction alterations.  Although the cost of vulnerability reduction alterations will likely be lower than the cost of countermeasure systems, a tradeoff analysis of the cost and effectiveness of these systems seems warranted.  Table 2 reveals that MANPADS posing the highest overall threat, driven by their availability and affordability and not their operational effectiveness, are susceptible to countermeasures.  Therefore, even lesser sophisticated countermeasures will likely provide a notable increase in protection.  Improved air traffic control tactics and security measures can be examined as near-term protective improvements while tradeoffs among technical options are examined.  Also, the recent arrest of a British arms dealer demonstrates a degree of effectiveness within the American law enforcement community.  This ability to thwart attempts to smuggle MANPADS into the U.S. may indicate that susceptibility and vulnerability reduction efforts on U.S. international flights is a higher priority than domestic flights.

 

The judgment that affordability and attainability drive the overall threat of MANPADS indicates that nonproliferation measures may be an effective means to “steering” terrorists away from more operationally effective systems.  Therefore, the combination of nonproliferation efforts (to steer terrorists toward less sophisticated MANPADS) and susceptibility reduction efforts (to make aircraft more secure against less sophisticated systems) appears to address the majority of potential threats.  Regardless, limiting the availability and affordability of more sophisticated MANPADS appears to be a prudent approach.  Continuation of America’s buyback plan, which has raised the market value of more sophisticated systems, seems to steer terrorists toward older Russian models for which susceptibility reduction measures can be reasonably devised.  Unfortunately, the ingenuity of terrorists and the imperfection of all security measures, no matter how well conceived, will likely leave some unpreventable opportunities for terrorist attacks.  Minimizing these opportunities is the realistic goal.