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Co-location of Hizballah and UN posts on Israel-Lebanon borderIsrael shifts strategy from proportional retaliation to deterrence

13 July 2006

 

Israel’s attacks against Lebanon and its incursion into Gaza are not merely a reaction to the recent kidnapping of Israeli soldiers by Hamas and Lebanese Hizballah.  Rather, Israel’s actions indicate a strategic change stemming from its assessment of the broad and prolonged threats these two terrorist organizations pose.  The kidnapping merely tipped the scale.

 

Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000, yet has continued to be attacked by Hizballah fighters on its border with Lebanon.  Also, although Israel unilaterally withdrew from the Gaza Strip and much of the West Bank, thus granting the Palestinians a realistic opportunity to establish a peaceful co-existence with Israel, the Palestinian people elected a majority Hamas government that is characterized by its anti-Israel message and – like Hizballah – is a militant proxy for Syria and Iran.  After Israel’s withdraw from Gaza, rocket attacks from Gaza on Israeli towns increased dramatically.  In other words, the carrot of freedom from occupation was not enough for Hamas or Hizballah.  Now, Israel has decided to use the stick.

 

Many international government officials have criticized Israel’s military response as “disproportionate” to the kidnappings.  If the kidnappings were the only threat posed by Hamas and Hizballah, then claims of a disproportionate Israeli response would be more defensible.  However, Israel’s heavy-handed response is arguably proportional to the overall threat it faces given the unprovoked and premeditated nature of the kidnappings, the long-standing policy of attacks against Israel, the prominent position of Hizballah and Hamas within their respective national governments, and the significant support for these terrorist organizations from Syria and Iran, who preach the total destruction of Israel.  Hamas and Hizballah are elected representatives of two neighboring governments: Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority, so Israel is treating attacks by these terrorist groups as attacks by the governments that are unwilling or unable to control them.

 

Proportional, tit-for-tat, responses have not yet provided security for Israel, so its government appears to have decided to evoke a strategy of deterrence to replace the long-standing policy of proportional retaliation.  As with nuclear deterrence during the Cold War, deterrence for Israel begins with convincing its adversaries that hostile actions against Israel come with a price.  The severity of Israel’s response aims to demonstrate that such a price will be higher than its adversaries are willing to pay.  Further, that price includes more than military costs.  The breadth of Israel’s actions, attacking deep within Palestinian and Lebanese territories, are also intended to create internal political implications for Hamas and Hizballah as the citizens that continue to tolerate, if not support, them are pressured as well.  Palestinian and Lebanese citizens have had little quantifiable incentive to shun the military actions of Hamas and Hizballah, which look more toward Damascus and Tehran for direction than to their citizens.  Israel seemingly intends for its increased pressure to provide that incentive and ultimately result in greater restraint being exercised by Hamas and Hizballah.

 

The policy of retaliation, wherein one attack results in a proportional response, has been acceptable by both sides and sustainable for decades.  It has undoubtedly not produced peace partly because both sides had little to fear by sabotaging diplomatic efforts by committing occasional acts of violence.  Perhaps Israel’s attempt to center its strategy on deterrence will ultimately lead to a status quo that shuns direct conflict between Israel and its adversaries, therefore allowing diplomacy a sufficient window of opportunity.

 

Image: Co-location of Hizballah and UN posts on Israel-Lebanon border (lower left, yellow flag - Hizballah; tall tower, white flag - UN)

 

Related: Reasons for U.S. and EU opposition to Iran's nuclear program

 

 

 

 

 

 

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