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Israel's Exit Strategy Dilemma; Options Proposed

17 July 2006

Current reporting claims that Israel has scaled back its conditions for a cease-fire.  Rather than requiring the complete disarmament of Hizballah, Prime Minister Olmert will agree to a cease-fire with Hizballah and Lebanon if its two soldiers are released, Hizballah's rocket attacks end, and Hizballah is replaced along Lebanon's southern border by the Lebanese army, thus providing a buffer between Israel and Hizballah.  A premature cease-fire will likely lead to a repeat of this crisis with deadlier consequences.

Many within the international community have criticized Israel's heavy-handedness over the last few days.  Russia, France, the UK, and others have called Israel's assault on Hizballah and Lebanese infrastructure (designed to limit routes for moving the hostages) as "disproportionate," referring to a norm of international relations that the response to an act of aggression should be of a similar scale.

Israel's response to the cross-border kidnapping of its soldiers by Hizballah was not merely a reaction to the kidnappings.  Thus, proportionality must be looked at more broadly.  Israel was reacting to the broad, and possibly growing, threat posed by the Iranian-backed Hizballah.  Were Israel to merely drop a few bombs or complain to the UN the threat would not disappear, and - some would argue - might be encouraged by the weak response.  The frequent use by Israeli officials of the expression "pay a price" at the onset of their campaign reveals a longer-term agenda for Israel; to remove or significantly diminish the threat against it so that memories of this campaign may serve to deter future aggression.

Establishing conditions conducive to this long-term strategy create a dilemma for Israel.  Hizballah and Iran have shown their hand.  Hizballah has made known the considerable size and capability of its weapons cache and has revealed Iran's suspected role.  Were Israel to merely call off its attacks on Hizballah without any permanent controls on Hizballah, then Iran would likely continue or increase its support to the terrorist organization, thus making a repeat of this crisis likely and more deadly.  A premature cease-fire by Israel would allow its adversaries to regroup, learn from their mistakes, and devise a better strategy for future terrorist attacks.  Add to this mix the potential for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon with which it could threaten Israel from Iran or from a Hizballah-controlled forward area in Lebanon (re: Cuban missile crisis), and Israel has little to gain from stopping its operations before Hizballah is significantly weakened and Lebanese sentiment leans heavily against the continued existence of Hizballah's military wing.  Unfortunately, the longer the campaign persists, the more that innocent Lebanese are affected and the greater their anti-Israeli sentiment grows.

As Condoleezza Rice and other international diplomats descend on the region to negotiate a cease-fire, they would benefit by noting that a quick end to this campaign could also lead to a quick return to violence.   A better path to long-term peace involves a comprehensive security solution that provides Lebanon control of its territory, discourages Syrian and Iranian intervention, and reestablishes the internationally recognized borders around Israel.

Several options exist for helping reach these three conditions:

• Include incentives against Iranian intervention in ongoing UN Security Council discussions over Iran's nuclear program.  Iran's continued involvement in terrorist activity, in essence running proxy wars, is a primary reason that Iran's nuclear weapons program is intolerable to the international community.  India, for example, has recently established a nuclear cooperation agreement with the U.S. in part due to its overly peaceful behavior.  The UN could consider providing Iran a path toward nuclear cooperation that involved the verified cessation of its terrorist affiliations.  This option would likely be welcomed by Iran's increasingly liberal population, thus adding to internal pressures, although notable sanctions would likely be needed to convince the Iranian regime that real change is in its best interests.

• Develop a road-map for returning the Golan Heights to Syria, provided its support for Hizballah, Hamas, and other terrorist organizations and its continued meddling in Lebanese affairs are ended.  Consider the long-term placement of an effective UN peacekeeping force in the Golan Heights.  Israel cannot return the Golan Heights to Syria until Israel can be assured that this strategically significant area will not be used for an attack on Israel.  Syria and Hizballah seem unwilling to support a true cease-fire until the Golan Heights is returned to Syria.  A road-map for its hand-over will weaken any argument for continued violence against Israel.  Then again, Hizballah was formed to remove Israel from Lebanon but has only strengthened since Israel's withdrawal in 2000.  This fact further supports Israel's current campaign to significantly weaken Hizballah while the opportunity exists.