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U.S. policy toward North Korea nearing checkmate

07 October 2006

 

Some pundits assess that the Bush administration chose diplomacy to address the ongoing North Korean crisis because the U.S. recognizes the limitations of military options vis-a-vis North Korea and is reticent to use force following the debacle in Iraq. These reasons are relevant, as the U.S. has few, if any, viable military alternatives given North Korea's credible military threat and proximity to Seoul. Further, direct engagement with North Korea has failed in the past, such as the 1994 bilateral agreement that Pyongyang betrayed with the secret resumption of its nuclear weapons program. However, Bush's diplomatic strategy toward North Korea is not unique, but stems from the administration's longstanding policy toward China, which has been successful. Namely, the U.S. will largely ignore provocations, as a parent would a child, until the parties involved realize the futility of seeking to gain leverage outside of the formal negotiating process.

Tensions between the U.S. and China peaked during the Clinton administration following the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Throughout the Clinton presidency, the Chinese engaged in minor provocations with the U.S. and received a reaction from a U.S. president determined to establish a stable relationship. Clinton's reactive approach backfired, as China realized that it could induce U.S. concessions through minor acts or mere threats. Robert Sutter, the former U.S. National Intelligence Officer for East Asia, assessed Clinton's approach as follows:

The second Clinton administration was seen by Beijing as anxious to avoid major downturns or "swings" in the China relationship that might have jeopardized the passage of permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) legislation in Congress and called attention to the president's mixed record on handling China policy. Against this background, the Clinton administration gave China the highest priority in U.S. Asia policy - a potential source of leverage for the PRC.


The Bush administration took a different approach from the outset. In March 2001, shortly after Bush's inauguration, China tested the new U.S. president by causing the downing of a U.S. spy plane flying off the coast of China. The crew was taken into Chinese custody. Instead of engaging the matter at the presidential level or dispatching the typical high-level envoy, Bush allowed the issue to be resolved through normal diplomatic channels. The U.S. was not provoked, did not offer concessions, and the crisis subsided. China has been less provocative since.

The Bush administration's policy toward North Korea reflects a similar tactic. Pyongyang has been conducting increasingly provocative acts aimed at extorting concessions from the members of the six-party talks. Pyongyang's insistence on direct talks with the U.S., a request that Washington continues to refuse, indicates that North Korea mainly seeks concessions and recognition from the U.S.

Bush's hands-off approach is yielding two successes for America's foreign policy interests. First, the focus on six-party talks are demonstrating China's inability to exert control in its own neighborhood, let alone globally. This weakness publicly debunks the ever-present "China is an emerging super power" myth. China has a long way to go to achieve the level of global influence needed to justify the super power label. Second, by ignoring North Korea's provocations, the U.S. is drawing out additional - and escalating - provocation attempts. For example, the U.S. largely downplayed Pyongyang's July missile tests, which drew a stronger reaction from Japan than the U.S. The U.S. did not offer North Korea direct talks or any other concessions. So, Pyongyang increased the stakes and is now threatening to test a nuclear weapon.

Eventually, Pyongyang will engage in an act designed to capture the attention of the U.S. that will cross the red line of China or the other six-party nations. After this point, the U.S. will be able to more fully leverage the diplomatic force of these nations and will have legitimacy for whatever action the U.S. decides to take.

 

 

 

 

 
 

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