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Iran finalizing its control of Iraq

Adam Schneider

03 December 2006

 

U.S. political, military, and media figures are debating whether the U.S. should withdraw from Iraq immediately or when progress against the insurgency permits a hand-off to Iraqi forces .  This is the wrong debate.  Iran - not al Qaeda or the insurgency - is the primary threat to Iraq's democratic viability and is an immediate threat to U.S. influence in the Middle East.  Iran's upper hand means it has no need for compromise.  Iran grows nearer to control over Iraq because the U.S. grows nearer to withdrawal or significant troop reductions.  Options for combating Iran's influence are assessed.

 

A politically charged and nuanced debate rages over whether Iraq is heading toward civil war or already experiencing it.  Calls continue for a U.S. strategy to “win” in Iraq, but America’s diminishing political will, Iraq’s increasing sectarian violence, and meddling by Iran and Syria strongly suggest that something less than a U.S. “victory” is certain.  It is time to begin preparing for the repercussions of this potential outcome.  The released judgments of the April 2006 National Intelligence Estimate, “Trends in Global Terrorism,” highlight the importance of U.S. success in Iraq, as it relates to al Qaeda and its sympathizers.  Two judgments are most relevant: (1) “[P]erceived jihadist success [in Iraq] would inspire more fighters to continue the struggle elsewhere,” and (2) “Should jihadists leaving Iraq perceive themselves, and be perceived to have failed... fewer fighters will be inspired to carry on the fight.”  However, U.S. failure in Iraq has more dire consequences than inspiring al Qaeda or its sympathizers.  Iran has established control over several prominent Shiite militias, such as Moqtada al Sadr's Mahdi army, and strongly influences several arms of the Iraqi government via its proxy political groups, such as SCIRI.  Iran is using these influences to fuel the violence that threatens to hasten a U.S. withdrawal and to prevent the formation of a strong Iraqi central government.  A failure to achieve U.S. objectives in Iraq would be harmful to U.S. interests, but a failure to prevent Iran from achieving its objectives in Iraq would be strategically disastrous and unacceptable.  Yet, if domestic instability in Iraq escalates to all-out civil war, then an opportunity will exist for the U.S. to achieve a strategic success against the Middle East’s greatest destabilizing force, Iran.  This article explores the best among the remaining bad options.

 

To begin, consider three judgments:

 

First, the U.S. cannot achieve victory in Iraq without the acquiescence, if not the cooperation, of Tehran.  The large Shia majority in Iraq, fueled by the entrenchment of political and paramilitary elements beholden to Iran, provides Iran immense influence over Iraq’s future.  Iranian leaders have threatened publicly that they could make matters worse for the U.S. in Iraq.  The 23 August 2006 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence report on Iran agreed:

 

Some Iranian assistance to Iraqi insurgents already has been provided.  However, through its terrorist proxies, intelligence service, Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and other tools of power projection and influence, Iran could at any time significantly ramp up its sponsorship of violent attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East if it believed doing so would keep the United States distracted or would otherwise be in Iran’s national interest.

 

Second, Iran’s strategy to counter U.S. attempts to halt its Uranium enrichment program (it is probably safe to call it a nuclear weapons program) has succeeded and Iran remains determined to continue enriching Uranium "without fear."  Iran has convinced a majority of the UN General Assembly to support its “right” to enrich Uranium and has maintained its international political top-cover – and UN Security Council veto support – from Russia, China, and France despite America’s diplomatic push for sanctions.  Also, Iran has taken numerous prudent steps to lessen the harm sanctions could cause, such as stockpiling goods and moving cash beyond U.S. and European reach.  In the Autumn 2006 issue of The Washington Quarterly, Sanam Vakil argues that:

 

Iran’s carefully cultivated relationships with China, Russia, and India are providing it with the economic and political coverage that it could never obtain from the West.  From the perspective of Iran’s leaders and their Eastern counterparts, a perfect storm of interests is gathering, anchoring the strategic Silk Road and enabling these countries to circumvent the United States and Europe.  This shift has been effective in light of the pending nuclear crisis, as Iran is now successfully using its cultivated commercial and strategic relations with China, Russia, and India to counterbalance the threat of Western nuclear sanctions.

 

Further, Iran has arguably removed all meaningful U.S. military options by burying and dispersing elements of its nuclear program, helping mire the U.S. in Iraq, and establishing a credible counterattack threat vis-à-vis terrorist proxies, e.g., Hizballah, around the globe.  Israel's recent conflict with Hizballah suggests that Hizballah's capabilities have been underestimated, and it has been rearming since the conflict ended.

 

Third, an outcome in Iraq that leaves the U.S. impotent and maintains Iran’s current level of influence would be a disaster for everyone except Iran, Syria, Hizballah, and Hamas.  Iraq could serve as a land bridge between Iran and Syria (e.g., for transporting weaponry) and a conduit for escalating Iran’s proxy war – via Hizballah and Hamas – against Israel.  The Palestinians and Lebanese would suffer from this escalation because they are the pawns.  Israel may decide it has no option but to attack Iran, which could inflame the region and likely instigate unacknowledged or overt U.S. involvement.  Syria, bound by a defense pact with Iran, would likely join the fight.  Iran-backed Shia militias (“death squads”) in Iraq would be freer to increase their slaughter of Sunnis throughout Iraq.  Resultant fear within Iraq’s Kurdish community could spread to Turkey and prompt an always-possible Turkish invasion of northern Iraq.  Saudi Arabia, another state susceptible to extremist takeover, could seek to restore the regional balance of power by acquiring nuclear weapons, which has been a possibility for years.  U.S. credibility as a military and political force in the region would be severely damaged.

 

Iran's Objectives in Iraq

 

Iran has three primary objectives in Iraq aiming to prevent Iraq's resurgence as a regional power and remove - or greatly reduce - the U.S. footprint in the region.  These objectives are:

 

1. Maintain its control over dominant Shiite political and military elements in Iraq.  Iran's control over majority political elements will continue to provide it notable influence in Iraq, even if Iraq establishes a functional democracy.

 

2. Maintain Shiite political dominance over Iraq or establish a separate Shiite state.  A civil war in Iraq could benefit Iran because Iraqi Shia control large portions of Iraq's territory and oil resources.  Further, splitting Iraq into Kurdish, Sunni, and Shiite regions will lessen the need for Shia to compromise with Sunni and Kurdish factions and prevent the formation of an Iraqi regime capable of threatening Iran.  Iran's strategic interests are largely indifferent to a civil war in Iraq, as long as it does not spread to Iran.

 

3. Facilitate the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq or severely diminish their freedom of action, particularly within Shiite-controlled areas.  The presence of U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan provide the U.S. an invaluable geographical location from which it could "contain" or potentially invade Iran, or so Iran fears.  Further, U.S. forces in Iraq inhibit the Shiite militias, as U.S. forces periodically target them.  Yet, as Iraqi security forces, which are predominantly Shia, "step up," the potential exists for U.S. forces to have fewer opportunities and authority to act throughout Iraq.  Lessening these U.S. pressure points is in Iran’s interest.

 

Iran will have achieved its objectives in Iraq if it attains the withdrawal or shackling of U.S. forces.  Consequently, to prevent this Iranian triumph, the U.S. must successfully achieve one or both of two relevant objectives: (1) maintain throughout the duration of Iran's influence in Iraq a sufficient military presence in Iraq with adequate authority to act, or (2) sufficiently diminish Iran's influence in Iraq.

 

U.S. Options for Preventing Iran's Success in Iraq

 

The extent to which the U.S. maintains adequate force levels in Iraq with authority to act depends on the political climate in the U.S. and Iraq and is subject to factors beyond the control of any single administration.  The future political climate is largely unknowable, yet conditions exist in the U.S. and Iraq that suggest a possible, if not probable, loss of political will to keep U.S. forces engaged.  If this political will diminishes and Iran’s influence remains, Iran will have achieved its objectives in Iraq.

 

Few options exist for reducing Iran’s influence in Iraq.  According to significant reporting from Time, among others, Iran established a foothold in Iraq prior to the U.S. invasion.  In addition to exerting substantial influence over several powerful Shiite militias in Iraq, Iran also influences several prominent Shiite political parties, such as SCIRI, which were backed by Iran during Saddam’s reign.  Although Iran's control over Shiite elements in Iraq is not complete, i.e., many Iraqi Shia are distrustful of Iran, its control over the Shiite leadership elements is sufficient to meet its needs into the foreseeable future.  It is unlikely that the U.S. possesses the right kind and quantity of “carrots and sticks” to diminish Iran’s longstanding influence.  Further, few – if any – alternatives exist for Iraq’s Shiite population to wean itself off Iran-backed groups.  Iran’s political influence in Iraq is strong and will likely remain as such despite any U.S. course of action.

 

The U.S. could employ greater military force against Iran-backed Shiite militias in Iraq, such as Moqtada al Sadr’s Mahdi Army.  Several facts suggest that this approach will also be unsuccessful.  First, these militias enjoy widespread support among Iraq’s majority Shiite population.  Targeting the militias may be seen by Iraqi Shia as a U.S. attempt to curtail their power, if not support a Sunni resurgence.  Conspiracy theories abound in the Middle East and distrust of the U.S. runs deep.  The Iraqi people do not take U.S. intentions at face value.  A focused campaign by U.S. forces against Shiite militias may spurn a backlash among the Iraqi Shiite population and create a sizable Shiite insurgency that not only targets Sunnis, but also targets U.S. forces.  Any resultant tensions will be stoked by Iranian propaganda.  Second, the inability of the U.S. to control Sunni insurgents strongly suggests that the U.S. will also be unable to control Shiite militias. Hizballah’s performance against Israel in July 2006 demonstrates the notable capabilities of an Iran-backed proxy army.  Although the Mahdi Army is not as capable as Hizballah, it is not unreasonable to assess that its Iranian support will make it more effective than the amateur Sunni militias that challenge U.S. forces.

 

Because the U.S. lacks viable options to adequately diminish Iran’s influence over Shiite political parties and militias inside Iraq, an external course of action is needed.  Failure by the U.S. to achieve its objectives in Iraq will give Iran a strategic victory in the Middle East.  Since the U.S. cannot defeat Iran in Iraq, it must target Iran directly.

 

Little serious debate exists among U.S. military experts about an invasion of Iran aiming to topple its regime.  The options are too risky to be considered viable and the risk of blow back is high.  Yet, Tehran’s long-standing behavior and consistent rhetoric indicate that its sponsorship of terrorism, to include its meddling in Iraq, and its pursuit of nuclear weapons will not likely end without the replacement of its current extremist regime.  Air strikes alone will not achieve these objectives and may inspire Iranian nationalism and embolden Tehran.  An all-out U.S. ground invasion would be a disaster.  Therefore, regime change is America’s primary strategic goal for Iran and non-military means are the best bet for achieving that goal.

 

Target the Regime

 

Certain elements within the U.S. national security establishment remain hopeful that Iran will implode as its largely pro-Western youthful population revolts against its older extremist leadership.  Such a spontaneous revolt, under current conditions, is unlikely.  The mullahs have mastered the art of balancing cruel repression with the illusion of freedoms that allow the population to vent off steam within allowed boundaries.  Iranians, for the most part, may protest against aspects of their life as long as they do not cross any lines, such as opposing the Supreme Leader.  Dissenters who cross these lines are harshly punished.  Iranian “freedoms” should be viewed more as an emotional outlet than participation in the political process.  The mullahs operate a highly effective domestic security apparatus and fully control the political process, choosing which candidates may run for election. They do not face any notable threats of losing their grip on power.  Yet, the potential for domestic instability in Iran, however unlikely, remains the best opportunity for meaningful change within this increasingly dangerous regime.

 

U.S. failure in Iraq, should it occur, appears destined to take the form of civil war, wherein Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish populations will battle for control of land, resources, and legitimacy.  Moderate leaders in the Middle East have repeatedly expressed concern about this potential because they fear that the sectarian violence will spill beyond Iraq’s borders.  The recent conflict between Israel and Hizballah in Lebanon demonstrated that these concerns extend beyond Iraq.  Lebanon is a country torn by a civil war between Christian, Sunni, and Shiite factions, which then expanded to include Israel and Syria and spawned broad sympathy throughout the Middle East.  A parallel circumstance can be envisioned for Iraq and its neighbors.

 

Iran is a majority Persian/Shia state, but has a wide variety of ethnic minorities, many with ties to ethnic groups in Iraq.  If the U.S. is unable to stabilize Iraq, it must spread the Iraqi internal conflict via these minorities and other dissident groups to Iran.  The challenge for the U.S. will be aggravating fissures in Iran while isolating neighboring states.  For example, Kurdish tensions in Iraq could lead to Kurdish tensions in Iran but also in Turkey. The relative homogeneity of most Gulf neighbors will help the U.S. position, but Turkey and Syria are diverse and vulnerable.

 

Iran has successfully promoted instability in Iraq aiming to prevent the U.S. from establishing a neighboring base of operations from which it could “contain” or launch an attack on Iran.  The U.S. can reciprocate Iran’s gift of instability to ensure that the mullahs do not benefit from the aftermath of a U.S. failure in Iraq, or at a minimum, are placed on the defensive.  Several measures that aim to isolate Iran and fracture its population should be considered. These measures, outlined below, must be executed as part of a comprehensive plan because no single element is sufficient.

 

Shift the debate.  Many European and other key nations refuse to adequately acknowledge Iran's ties to terrorism.  For this reason, the U.S. focuses its diplomatic efforts on an area of common concern: Iran's nuclear program.  This approach, however, has not yielded any notable progress, nor does it suggest any for the future.  European-style "diplomacy" permits Iran to fend off international pressure as its nuclear program advances.  Therefore, associate U.S. condemnations and proposed punishments for Iran more with Iran's support for terrorism, which comprises 25 years of undeclared proxy war against the West and is not supported by moderate Iranians, than with its nuclear program, which promotes Iranian nationalism, is hailed as a sovereign right by many "have nots" in the international community, and is repeatedly declared to be non-negotiable by Iran.  The deterrent umbrella that a nuclear weapon would provide Iran is merely an enabler for its proxy wars against Israel and the West.

 

Promote an alternative.  A primary reason that Iranians will not spontaneously revolt from within is that they do not have an alternative leader for whom they are willing to risk the status quo.  The U.S. should leverage the resources and insights of the monarchist movement, which is largely based in the U.S. Although promoting a monarchy is against America’s traditional idealism toward spreading democracy, whether feasible or not, any argument that the current theocratic regime is the best among evils falls woefully short.  The monarchist movement currently promotes the compromise, possibly in words only, that if reinstated to power it would immediately call for a national referendum to determine the extent to which it should rule.  This compromise, if enforced, could allow the U.S. to gain the support of this community while also providing some measure of control over the post-revolution government.  Further, to limit the potential for a religiously inspired post-revolution insurgency, a credible religious figure must endorse the secular leadership figures.  A prominent Shiite figure in Iraq, considered by many to be the rightful base of Shia Islam, may be the ideal choice because this figure could help weaken the credentials of the Iranian Supreme Leader.  Again, it is hard to envision a government gaining power in Iran that is less desirable than the mullahs.

 

Implement sanctions with as broad a coalition as can be attained, but not necessarily through the UN, to ensure that increased financial difficulties coincide with rising domestic tensions, as sought by this proposal.  The U.S. already enforces unilateral sanctions.  Also, Iran has prepared for the possibility of additional sanctions by stockpiling goods likely to become scarce. Therefore, the efficacy of sanctions is limited.

 

Alienate the regime.  Solicit the support of neighboring states.  Secretary Rice appears to have already commenced this effort.  Every nation in the Middle East, with perhaps the exception of Syria, fears a dominant Iran, especially if Iran remains an extremist theocracy.  The potential exists to mount a vocal offensive against the Iranian regime, wherein its support for global terrorism is more clearly revealed.  Neighboring Sunni-majority states will suffer little domestic opposition to backing a U.S.-led effort to discredit Iran.

 

Publicize evidence that Iran is promoting civil war in Iraq.  Demonstrate to Iraqis, Iranians, and other Middle Eastern peoples that the Iranian regime is acting contrary to its propaganda of peace.  Moderate Iranians, who widely have access to Western media, will be displeased.  Be prepared to aggressively target Iran-backed groups in Iraq, such as the Mahdi army, if Iran decides to unleash them.

 

Highlight Iran’s support for Sunni Hamas to alienate the mullahs from their Shiite base.  Iran supports Hamas because (1) like Hizballah, it provides opportunities to attack Western interests while maintaining plausible deniability, and (2) because its armed resistance against Israel promotes Iran’s most compelling banner: the Palestinian cause.  Iran does not support a Palestinian state; it promotes perpetual Palestinian conflict until the end of Israel.

 

Clarify and highlight Iran’s support for Sunni al Qaeda, again to alienate the mullahs from their Shiite base.  The extent to which Iran supports al Qaeda remains unclear, but some cooperation reportedly exists.  The August 2006 House intelligence report on Iran weighs possible reasons for Iran to support al Qaeda against the typical dissenter's argument that al Qaeda's Sunni membership is the natural enemy of Shiite Iran.  Yet, the report acknowledges that Iran has provided support to at least three Palestinian Sunni terrorist groups, including Hamas.  From Sunni terrorists to South American dictators, Iran has a pragmatic track record of supporting anti-Americans, wherever they are found.  Regardless, the lack of certainty about this support provides an opportunity to shape public perception on the matter.  Again, neighboring states can be courted to play a supporting role.  Even if a convincing argument cannot be made about Iran’s support for al Qaeda, the claims may compel Tehran to prove its innocence by cracking down on known al Qaeda operatives living in Iran.

 

Covertly support the Mujahideen E-Khalq (MEK), Iran’s foremost opposition movement.  The U.S. has declared the fanatical MEK to be a terrorist organization – and rightly so – but no other organization operates a comparable military and espionage capability within Iran.  America’s idealistic foreign policy complicates U.S. efforts to support this terrorist group even though U.S. interests are served more than harmed.  The MEK’s aggressive tactics will produce benefits for the U.S. that will exceed the political fallout from claims by the Iranian regime that the U.S. is supporting terrorism.  Besides, the mullahs already label the U.S. "terrorists" and the MEK is currently conducting attacks without U.S. support.  The potential for blow back from supporting the MEK stems from the Iranian population's broad disdain for this organization.  Therefore, U.S. support must be covert and tightly controlled.  The MEK's ideology is not universally appealing, so it will not become the next al Qaeda, i.e., a former U.S.-backed resistance movement that gains widespread prestige, and it does not stand a realistic chance of seizing the reigns of power in Iran.  If the mullahs fall, the moderate majority stands the greatest chance of taking charge.

 

Conclusion

 

It is increasingly unlikely that the U.S. will achieve its objectives in Iraq.  Political battles in the U.S. combined with an increasingly frustrated U.S. population challenge the resolve of America’s leadership.  Shifts in America's political landscape, to include the waning days of the Bush presidency, may hasten the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq, whether by presidential decision or congressional budget tightening.

 

Conditions on the ground in Iraq pose an additional challenge as civil war seems more likely, if not already underway.  Such a prospect, which is at least possible, if not probable, may be more of an opportunity for the U.S. than is intuitively apparent.  If the U.S. fails to achieve its objectives in Iraq, U.S. leaders will be faced with two options: to leave quickly and quietly, thus handing the reigns of regional power to Iran, or to try to topple the Iranian regime in the process.

 

Permitting Iran to achieve its objectives in Iraq could mark the beginning of the end for U.S. power in the Middle East and lead to increased regional hostilities, particularly against Israel.  Iran will perceive itself and be perceived to be the dominant regional power, a condition that will be exploited by two of America’s more sizable adversaries and Iranian allies: China and Russia. Reestablishing U.S. dominance under these conditions will be far more difficult than reestablishing order following the chaos of an Iraqi civil war and the collapse of the Iranian regime.

 

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The author is an analyst in the U.S. national security community.

 

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